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Abramson: The Reliability of Our Medical Knowledge as a Product of Industry

THE RELIABILITY OF OUR MEDICAL
KNOWLEDGE AS A PRODUCT OF
INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIPS
John Abramson*
Comparing Americans' life expectancy and medical expenditures to
those of the other industrialized countries hardly leads to the conclusion
that we receive the best medical care in the world. Far from it. But the
argument is legitimately made that Americans receive more medical
treatments and procedures-like joint replacements, cataract surgeries,
cardiac procedures, and the like-that improve our quality but not
necessarily the length of our lives. To promote more meaningful
comparisons between citizens of different countries, the World Health
Organization created a more dimensional index of overall health known
as Healthy Adjusted Life Expectancy ("HALE"). Calculated as the
average number of healthy years of life experienced by each nation's
sample population, this index represents the number of years that a
country's citizens can expect to live in good health.1 For example, if a
citizen of one nation lives to be eighty-six, but has chronic renal failure
for the last six years of life, compromising his quality of life by fifty
percent, then his years of healthy life would be eighty-six minus half of
six, or eighty-three.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between HALE and per person
medical expenditures for the twenty-two wealthiest Organisation of
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") countries. Those
with the most effective and efficient healthcare systems are located in
the upper left quadrant, where healthy life expectancy is greatest and per
* Clinical Instructor at Harvard Medical School and author of Overdosed America. I would
like to thank Hofstra University President Stuart Rabinowitz, Dean Aaron Twerski, and Professors
Robert Wild, Janet Dolgin and Joel Weintraub, for hosting this important conference, providing us
with the opportunity to examine the pharmaceutical industry's relationship to the "scientific
evidence" that informs our medical care.
1. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2003: SHAPING THE FUTURE 21
(2003), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2003/en/whrO3-en.pdf.
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FIGURE 1

Healthy Average Life Expectancy and Per Person
Medical Expenses in 22 OECD Countries
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person medical costs are lowest. Japan is a clear outlier here. At the
other end of the spectrum, the lower right quadrant is where the
countries with the least effective and most costly healthcare are located.
Figure 1 shows that despite spending twice as much as the other
industrialized countries on healthcare, Americans live the shortest
amount of time in good health-averaging 2.5 years less than the
citizens of the other countries.2
Comparisons within the United States present an equally disturbing
picture. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the quality of medical
care for Medicare patients and per person costs on a state-by-state basis.
The quality measures used in this study are based on widely accepted
and non-controversial indicators, such as the percentage of patients
2. See id. at 166-69, 178-81; see also OECD Health at a Glance-How France Compares,
OECD OBSERVER POL'Y BRIEF, Oct. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/58/13/16073264.pdf (detailing how France compares with other countries and finding that
"health spending in France is relatively high in comparison with the... average").
3. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, the Physician Workforce,
and Beneficiaries' Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., Apr. 7, 2004, at W4-187 & exhibit 1,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.184v1.
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admitted to the emergency room with pneumonia who receive an
antibiotic within the first eight hours of arrival, and the percentage of
patients admitted to the hospital with a myocardial infarction who are
given an aspirin. States are ranked by the quality of their medical care
with the best state ranked number 1, and the worst state ranked number
51 (Puerto Rico is counted as a state). Intuitively, we expect a positive
correlation between money spent on healthcare and the quality of care,
or that the slope of the line plotting this relationship would go from the
lower left quadrant of the graph to the upper right. But the slope of the
line is exactly the opposite: the greater the per capita expenditure on
Medicare patients within a state, the lower the quality of care. 4
FIGuRE 2
Relationship Between Quality And Medicare Spending, As Expressed By Overall
Quality Ranking, 2000-2001
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Researchers from Dartmouth Medical School's Center for the
Evaluative Clinical Sciences looked at the variations in medical
spending in the 306 Medicare regions around the country. They found
that patients living in the highest spending regions received sixty percent
more care than patients living in the lowest spending region, and these
4. Id.
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differences were not explained by age, sex or disease burden. 5 They then
looked at how patients with three distinct disease entities-first heart
attack, first broken hip, and initial diagnosis of cancer of the colonfared according to the level of spending in their Medicare region. 6 It
turns out that patients in the higher spending regions had no better access
to care, no greater satisfaction with care, no better quality of care, and
actually had a higher mortality rate.7 Based on this data, later researchers
determined that if all Medicare patients with these three diseases
received the quality of care provided in the best performing quarter of
Medicare regions, we would not only save 8400 lives a year, but also
$900 million a year-better health outcomes for significantly less
money. 8 The results of the original study were published in two very
dense articles in the Annals of Internal Medicine.9 Dr. Elliot Fisher, the
lead author of this study, summarized the findings in an op-ed piece
published in the New York Times:
Our study suggests that perhaps a third of medical spending is now
devoted to services that don't appear to improve health or the quality
of care-and may make things worse.10
In 2006, the United States will spend approximately $2.2 trillion on
healthcare. 1 In other words, we are wasting about $700 billion a year on
medical care that is either unnecessary or harmful-that is more than
one and a half times the entire budget of the U.S. Defense Department,
including the cost of the war in Iraq. 12

5. Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending,
Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 273, 284-86

(2003) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Part 1].
6. Id. at 273-77.
7. See id. at 283-85; Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in
Medicare Spending, Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 288, 291-92 & fig. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Part2].
8. Cathy Schoen et al., U.S. Health System Performance: A National Scorecard, HEALTH
AFF., Sept. 20, 2006, at W469, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w457?ck-nck.
9. See supra notes 5-7.
10. Elliott S. Fisher, Op-Ed, More Medicine Is Not Better Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2003, at A23.
11. C. Eugene Steuerle, Senior Fellow, The Urban Inst., Economic Challenges Facing Middle
Class Families, Testimony Before the Comm. on Ways and Means 2 (Jan. 31, 2007).
12. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Fiscal 2006 Department of Defense Budget is
Released (Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr200502072066.html (requesting "$419.3 billion in discretionary budget authority for the Department of
Defense").
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Authors from the Commonwealth Fund recently published a score
card on American medicine in Health Affairs, the premier American
health policy journal. 13 This study established reasonably attainable
benchmarks for healthcare quality, access, equity, and outcomes.
According to these measures of reasonably attainable levels of
performance, an optimal score of 100 in each of these areas was actually
being achieved, for international comparisons, by the average of the
three best countries, or, for comparisons within the United States, the
best ten percent of states. Overall, American healthcare earned a score of
sixty-six, 14 otherwise known as a straight "D". Some examples of
comparisons solidify the point: the infant mortality rate in the United
States is 7.0 per 100,000 births, while the benchmark is 2.7; sixty yearold men in the United States have a 2.1 year shorter life expectancy than
the international benchmark, and sixty year-old American women live
2.9 years less; the efficiency of our healthcare-how much health we get
for the money we spend-earned a fifty-one, or a straight "F". 15 In other
words, we are wasting enormous amounts of public and private
resources on suboptimal medical care.
It is important to understand that this overview of American
healthcare is not just the view of an unhappy radical minority. The first
chapter of the recently published book Redefining Healthcare, by
Professors Michael E. Porter of Harvard Business School and Elizabeth
Olmsted Teisberg of the University of Virginia, presents a very similar
snapshot of American healthcare.16
The obvious question is: How can so many dedicated, wellmeaning health professionals and policy makers proceed with healthcare
as usual when the totality of their effort is so wasteful and ineffective?
The answer is that the source of these problems lies deep beneath the
surface of what appears to be a reasonably functioning healthcare
system. Above the surface we see the more than $4 billion in advertising
that floods our airwaves, newspapers, and sporting events,' 7 hawking
prescription drugs directly to American consumers-among
industrialized countries, such direct-to-consumer advertising is allowed

13. See Schoen et al., supra note 8.
14. Id. at W472-73.
15. Id. at W473.
16. See MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE:
CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON RESULTS 17-32 (2006).
17. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED IN FDA's OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 12 (2006).
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only in the United States and New Zealand.' 8 Doctors and other
healthcare providers are also the targets of intense marketing. There is
one drug representative for every five office-based doctors.' 9 Sixty
percent or more of doctors' continuing medical education is funded by
the medical industries.2 ° Countless free lunches, educational dinners,
ballpoint pens, clocks, sticky pads, and other promotional gifts, are
constant reminders of drug companies' relentless intrusion into the
practice of medicine. And a growing army of lobbyists representing the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA")
and the medical industry to "educate" our senators and congressman
show up in Washington each year-one lobbyist for every member of
Congress in 2004, two in 2005, and now reportedly three.2 '
But the "core lesion," as we say in medicine, remains hidden in
plain sight: The fundamental role of medical knowledge in our society
has been quietly but radically transformed over the past twenty-five or
thirty years from a public good into a private commodity, produced for
its potential commercial value rather than its potential to improve
Americans' health. Since the late 1970s, the medical research enterprise
has been almost completely privatized. At least seventy percent of
clinical trials are now commercially sponsored.22 And the fundamental
purpose for which this research is done is consistent with the primary
fiduciary responsibility of the pharmaceutical and other medical
industries-to maximize their return on research investment for their
shareholders and investors.
There are two perspectives from which the "knowledge" that
informs doctors' decisions can be viewed. It can be considered from an
idealist or Platonic perspective, as a small bit of scientifically proven
absolute truth. For the most part, this is the perspective that doctors are
taught, and for which they are held responsible when they practice the
"evidence-based medicine" that reflects the scientific research published

18. Id. at 8.
19. Scott Hensley, As Drug-Sales Teams Multiply, Doctors Start to Tune Them Out, WALL
ST. J., June 13, 2003, at Al.

20. Arnold S. Relman, Letter in Reply, Industry Sponsorship of Continuing Medical
Education, 290 JAMA 1149, 1150 (2003) (arguing that over sixty percent "of the total amount spent
on [continuing medical education] came from industry").
21. Interview with Sam Brunelli, President, Team Builders International, Washington, DC., in
Avon, Colo. (Nov. 18, 2007).
22. Michelle M. Mello et al., Academic Medical Centers' Standards for Clinical-Trial
Agreements with Industry, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2202, 2202 (2005).
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in the medical journals. 23 Alternatively, medical knowledge can be
regarded from the sociological perspective, asking what the criteria are
by which doctors determine whether to accept a particular piece of new
information as legitimate,24 and why doctors consider the scientific
evidence about these particular issues instead of others.
A landmark article published in 1982 in the journal Science pointed
out the transition: "Scientists who [ten] years ago would have snubbed
their academic noses at industrial money now eagerly seek it out. '25 The
transformation gained momentum when President Reagan came to office
' in 1980, inheriting a weak economy and bringing with him a mandate to
downsize government. One of his first actions was to downsize the
funding at the National Institutes of Health for clinical trials.2 6 To fill
this void, the pharmaceutical industry increased expenditures on
research and development six-fold between 1977 and 1990.27 There is
nothing inherently wrong with this transition to commercial funding of
clinical trials. Private enterprise is the engine that drives much of the
ingenuity in our economy. The drug companies invest in research with
the goal of developing socially useful products in order to maximize
their profits. The problem is not with the entrepreneurial incentives of
capitalism, but with the academic and regulatory context in which this
transition has unfolded and continues to unfold. Just as the need for
adequate government and academic oversight of commercially-funded
"scientific evidence" being purveyed as "medical knowledge" was
increasing, the effectiveness of that oversight was being eroded by the
growing influence of the drug and other medical industries.
During the 1980s, the proportion of funding for clinical trials
coming from commercial sources grew significantly. Even so, not much
changed in the quality of our medical literature between 1980 and 1991
because, until 1991, about eighty percent of these commercially-funded
trials were still performed in universities, where academic researchers
continued to play a major role in designing the research, analyzing the

23. See Evidence-Based Med. Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach
to Teaching the Practiceof Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420, 2420 (1992).
24.

SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY

136-38 (1993).
25. Barbara J. Culliton, The Academic-IndustrialComplex, 216 SCIENCE 960, 960 (1982).
26. See Reagan'sScience Budget: Cries of Pain,THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1982, at 79-80.
27. JOHN ABRAMSON, OVERDOSED AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 94 (2004).
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data, and overseeing publication of the results. 28 But this changed
radically in the following decade. By 2000, only forty-one percent of
commercially funded clinical trials were conducted in universities-the
rest outside of academic environments by for-profit contract research
organizations ("CROs"). 29 And by 2004 this number had dwindled to
twenty-six percent.30
There is nothing inherently unethical about the pharmaceutical
industry contracting with private research companies to do their studies.
Again, the efficiency of the marketplace is at work. The for-profit
research companies can conduct studies more quickly, with less red tape
and less overhead than academic medical centers. But this transition
radically changed the locus of control of medical research:
Responsibility for research design, data analysis, and publication shifted
from academic researchers and institutions to the commercial sponsors
of the research. This left many of the authors of the papers that became
accepted as scientific evidence without free access to their own data.3'
And medical journal editors and peer reviewers only have access to the
manuscripts submitted to them, not to the research protocols (to verify
whether the manuscript accurately reflects the original outcome
measures and other pre-specified details) or to the raw data (to verify
that the conclusions drawn are supported by the actual results).
The dialectic of the commercialization did not stop there. The next
step was that the major advertising agencies began buying up these
CROs. 32 Again, there is nothing unethical here. This is perfectly logical
because the primary purpose for which commercially-sponsored medical
research is undertaken is to maximize product sales, and there is no one
better to oversee the process of creating the "knowledge" to best support
sales than the real specialists-the advertisers.
The bottom line is that the scientific evidence appearing in even our
most trusted medical journals is now heavily biased to support
commercial sponsors' products. A study published in the Journalof the
American Medical Association ("JAMA"), titled Empirical Evidence for
28. See Thomas

Bodenheimer,

Uneasy Alliance:

Clinical Investigators and the

PharmaceuticalIndustry, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1540 (2000). By 2004, this number had

dwindled to twenty-six percent. See Robert Steinbrook, Gag Clauses in Clinical-TrialAgreements,
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2160,2161 (2005).
29. See id.
30. Steinbrook, supra note 21, at 2161-62.
31. See Bodenheimer, supra note 28, at 1541-42.
32. See Melody Petersen, Madison Ave. Has Growing Role in the Business of Drug Research,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at Al.
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Selective Reporting of Outcomes and Randomized Trials, found
significant disparities between the outcome measures identified in the
original protocols and the articles that purportedly presented the
results. 33 Overall, fifty percent of efficacy measures and sixty-five
percent of harm measures that were identified in protocols were reported
incompletely in the published reports of the clinical trials.3 4 The article
concludes:
The reporting of trial outcomes is not only frequently incomplete but
also biased and inconsistent with protocols. Published articles, as well
as reviews that incorporate them, may therefore
be unreliable and
35
overestimate the benefits of an intervention.
Another study published in JAMA looked at the highest quality
clinical trials, the ones that are accepted into the Cochrane reviews, 36 and
found that when a study is commercially funded the odds are 5.3 times
greater that it will conclude that the sponsor's drug is the treatment of
choice than when a study of exactly the same drug is non-commercially
funded. 37 So, doctors are being implored to practice evidence-based
medicine in the new privatized research enterprise, more than 3.2 times
as often they are being implored to practice "infomercial-based"
medicine.
Therein lies an enormous and rapidly growing problem-going
back to the sociological perspective of knowledge, doctors have been
well trained to accept the conclusions of these articles at face value. An
article that appeared on the front page of the New York Times Science
Times section last May quoted the current editor of the Lancet and the
former editor of the British Medical Journal, saying that medical
"[j]oumals have devolved into information-laundering operations for the

33. An-Wen Chan et al., Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in
Randomized Trials, 291 JAMA 2457, 2457 (2004).
34. Id. at 2461, tbl.3 & fig.3.
35. Id.
at 2457.
36. The Cochrane Library "consists of a regularly updated collection of evidence-based
medicine databases, including The Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews." The Cochrane
Collaboration, http://cochrane.org/reviews/clibintro.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). Cochrane
reviews "are based on the best available information about healthcare interventions. They explore
the evidence for and against the effectiveness and appropriateness of treatments (medications,
surgery, education, etc.) in specific circumstances." Id.
37. Bodil Als-Nielsen et al., Association of Funding and Conclusions in Randomized Drug
Trials,290 JAMA 921, 924-25 & tbl.3 (2003).
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pharmaceutical industry." 38 This is an ethical, scientific and political
crisis that we can no longer afford to ignore-because of its cost in
terms of dollars and, even more important, its cost in terms of our health.
When one discusses the ethics of biomedical research and the law,
one must understand that the fundamental ethical problem here is that
the primary goal of the medical research enterprise itself is not to
optimize America's health, but rather, to fulfill pharmaceutical industry
executives' primary-and fiduciary-responsibility: to maximize return
on research investment for shareholders. But entrepreneurial incentives
driving medical research need not necessarily be a bad system, as long
as there are adequate regulatory and oversight mechanisms in place to
ensure both the accuracy and epidemiological balance of commercially
sponsored medical research. However, just as the process of medical
knowledge creation and dissemination was being privatized, the
academic institutions', medical journals', and FDA's ability to provide
independent oversight to maintain the integrity of our medical
knowledge has been weakened by growing dependence on drug and
other medical industry revenues.
As a result of the Prescription Drug User Fee Agreement,
("PDUFA"),3 9 the division of the FDA that approves new drugs and
oversees drug safety, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, is
now more than half-funded by the drug industry. 40 Academic medical
centers rely upon industry sponsorship for seventy-nine percent of
clinical trials they conduct. 41 And the medical journals are in the
untenable position of having to trust the veracity of commerciallysponsored studies without having the access or the resources necessary
to evaluate whether submitted manuscripts accurately reflect the results
of studies. Dr. Drummond Rennie, Deputy Editor of JAMA, told the
Wall Street Journal: "Science depends on trust ....You can't have a
policeman in every lab." ' 2

38.

Lawrence K. Altman, ForScience's Gatekeepers, A Credibility Gap, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,

2006, at F 1.
39. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379g note (2000)).
40. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES,
WITHDRAWALS, AND OTHER AGENCY ACTIVITIES 8, 9 fig.1 (2002).

41.

Mello et al., supra note 22, at 2204.

42. Anna Wilde Mathews, Worrisome Ailment in Medicine: Misleading Journal Articles,
WALL ST. J., May 10, 2005, at Ai.
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And finally, academic researchers are no longer protected from
commercial pressure, as described in a joint statement by thirteen editors
of the world's leading medical journals:
Investigators may have little or no input into trial design, no access to
the raw data, and limited participation in data interpretation. These
terms are draconian for self-respecting scientists, but many have
accepted them because they43know that if they do not, the sponsor will
find someone else who will.
So we have a big problem, and thus the title of this Article: The
Reliability of Our Medical Knowledge as a Product of Industry
Relationships. What are the criteria of reliability? First, are the research
results presented in respected, peer reviewed journals consistent with the
pre-specified outcome measures of benefit and harm identified in the
original research designs and based upon an unbiased analysis of the
data?
Let us examine Merck's large post-approval study ("VIGOR") of
its former blockbuster arthritis drug Vioxx, comparing the actual data
that Merck submitted to the FDA to the results of the VIGOR trial that
were published in the New England Journal of Medicine ("NEJM") in
November of 2000.4 4 The research design led to a skewed sample of
patients in the study, hardly representative of the general population of
people who would be using Vioxx. Fifty-five percent of the people in the
study were taking steroids concurrently with an anti-inflammatory drug,
which accentuates gastrointestinal ("GI") problems.45 In addition, only
four percent of people included in the study had a history of
cardiovascular disease that would make them candidates for prophylactic
aspirin, whereas in the general population twenty percent or more of
takers of non-steroid anti-inflammatory drugs ("NSAIDs") have a
history of cardiovascular problems.4 6 As a result, the potential of this
study to determine the potential of Vioxx to increase in the risk of
cardiovascular harm was minimized in the study population.
Nonetheless, were the results of the VIGOR trial presented in a fair
and balanced way in this article? Even though the reduction in serious

43. Frank Davidoff et al., Editorial, Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability, 345 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 825, 825 (2001).

44. See Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper GastrointestinalToxicity of Rofecoxib
and Naproxen in Patients with RheumatoidArthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520 (2000).

45. See id. at 1523.
46. Id.
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GI complications experienced by the patients taking Vioxx instead of
naproxen was actually overshadowed by the increased number of serious
cardiovascular complications, the NEJM article failed to report the
cardiovascular complications-just a post hoc subset of cardiovascular
complications, myocardial infarctions. 4
So even the most disciplined doctors, carefully reading our most
prestigious medical journal, could not have known that there were more
cardiovascular problems caused by Vioxx than serious GI problems
prevented by Vioxx. Nor could they have known that the VIGOR study
really showed that, overall, Vioxx caused significantly more serious
adverse events than did naproxen.48 Moreover, the data for heart attacks,
presented instead of cardiovascular complications in toto, were reported
incompletely. In December 2005, the editors of NEJM wrote an
"Expression of Concern" stating that three of the heart attacks that
occurred among people taking Vioxx had not been included in the
November 2000 article even though the Merck-employed authors of the
article knew about these three heart attacks at latest by July 2000-a full
four and a half months before the NEJM article was published.49 Of the
thirteen authors of this article, eleven were non-Merck employees, and
two were Merck employees. The eleven non-Merck employees,
including the lead author, responded to the editors' Expression of
Concern, writing that the three heart attacks were not "known to [them]
during the review process. ' '5 ° In other words, these eleven authors
including the lead author, were not provided unfettered access to the data
from the study that was published under their names in NEJM. And still
unexplained is why the NEJM editors waited nearly four years after
becoming aware of this to inform their readers that omission of the three
heart attacks led to readers being falsely reassured that the increased rate
of heart attacks experienced by people taking Vioxx instead of naproxen
did not extend to people without a previous history of cardiovascular
disease. 5'
47. Id.
48.

QIAN LI, STATISTICAL REVIEWER BRIEFING DOCUMENT FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

5-15 (2000), availableat http://www.fda.gov/ohrns/dockets/ac/0l/briefing/3677b2-04-stats.pdf.
49. Gregory D. Curfman et al., Editorial, Expression of Concern: Bombardier et al.,
"Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with
Rheumatoid Arthritis," N Engl J Med 2000;343:1520-8, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2813,2813 (2005).
50. Claire Bombardier et al., Correspondence, Response to Expression of Concern Regarding
VIGOR Study, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1196, 1196-98 (2006).

51. "The editors first became aware of the additional myocardial infarctions in 2001 when
updated data were made public by the Food and Drug Administration." Expression of Concern,
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The second criterion of the reliability is whether or not the results
are published at all, and therefore available to doctors, purchasers of
healthcare, and policy makers. The classic example here is the safety and
efficacy of antidepressants in the treatment of depressed children and
adolescents. In the scientific literature there were six articles, all
showing these drugs to be safe and effective. Clinicians had good reason
to believe that treatment of depressed children and adolescents with the
new antidepressants was evidence-based care. What they did not know is
that there were not six, but fifteen studies of the safety and efficacy of
these drugs in children and adolescents that had been completed. The
other nine studies had shown that the drugs were neither effective nor
safe-that they doubled the rate of suicidal thoughts and behaviors. In
fact, even among the six positive studies that were published, the claims
in three "were not confirmed after independent analysis by the
' 52
regulatory agencies.
And finally, the third criterion of reliability--does the research
enterprise reasonably reflect the implied goals of improving health and
addressing the epidemiological challenges of the population? This is
where our research is really failing. Health is primarily determined by
how and where we live our lives. A study by researchers from the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation shows that forty percent of our health is
determined by behavioral patterns, fifteen percent by social
circumstances, and five percent by environment.53 The Institute of
Medicine has observed that seventy percent of preventable deaths in the
United States are due to behavior and environmental factors.54 And yet

supra note 50, at 2813. The NEJM editors stated that they "believed that these were late events that
were not known to the authors in time to be included in the article published in the Journal on
November 23, 2000." Id. However, it makes little difference to prescribing doctors or their patients
exactly when the authors knew of the additional three heart attacks; the editors' primary concern
should have been that care being rendered by doctors trusting the NEJM was based on false
information and should have been corrected as soon as possible-regardless of why the information
was false.
52. Antidepressant Medications in Children and Adolescents, THERAPEUTICS

LETTER

(Therapeutics
Initiative,
Vancouver,
B.C.),
Apr./May/June
2004,
available at
http://www.ti.ubc.ca/PDF/52.pdf (discussing the controversy surrounding the fifteen randomized
studies, of which only six were published).
53. J. Michael McGinnis et al., The Case for More Active Policy Attention to Health
Promotion, 21 HEALTH AFF. 78, 78-83 (2002).
54. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 21 (2003).
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we focus ninety-five percent of our time and money on biomedical
interventions, not epidemiologically balanced interventions."
The misdirection of our research agenda is being driven by the drug
companies, which now sponsor at least seventy percent of clinical
research, directing their studies to the areas that have the greatest
potential to maximize return on investments. At best-without fraud,
misrepresentation, or selective publication of positive studies-our
medical knowledge grows toward corporate profits the way that plants
grow toward sunlight, and not in the direction that would best improve
the health of our population.
I think most would agree that the primary mission of American
healthcare ought to be to optimize Americans' health as efficiently as
possible, while maintaining reasonable individual freedoms. I continue
to hope that the medical profession can explore better ways to harness
the engine of private enterprise to serve our shared commitment to
achieve a more effective and efficient healthcare system.

55.

McGinnis et al., supra note 52, at 78.
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